Inventory investment in the recent recession and recover by John A. Tatom
HE behavior of mventory investment since the
beginning of the 1973-75 recession has been a domi-
nant concern of economic analysts. Initially, this con-
cern was motivated by a recognition that a relation-
ship between inventory investment and changes in
total output and employment has been one of the
most pronounced regulanties of the business cycle.
This relationship appears to be such a dominant
factor in previous postwar recessions that they have
been referred to as “inventory recessions.”1 Conse-
quently, inventory behavior is watched closely as
at least a potential indicator of prospective changes
in output and employment. More recently, attention
has been focused upon the 1976 “pause” in economic
growth. One of the principal hypotheses purporting to
explain this situation relies heavily upon inventory
investment behavior.
The 1973-75 recession was the longest and most
severe in postwar experience. Its causes, at least
initially, were unique,2 The behavior of inventory
investment during the recession, while deceptively
similar to that of prior recessions, was also unique.
Inventory investment declined sharply during the
recession, but it remained much higher than prior
experience would indicate. This deviation from prior
experience has had a very significant impact on inven-
tory investment, economic activity, and the views of
policy-makers in the first two years of recovery and
expansion.
Inventories consist of raw materials, work-in-prog-
ress, arid finished goods. There are many reasons
for holding items in inventory, such as the cost and
availability of goods required in the production proc-
ess, the length and flexibility of the production period,
arid the variability of market demand. The basic
motives may be summarized as transactions, precau-
tionary, or speculative motives.
Firms tend to hold some inventories simply to be
able to meet their expected levels of sales. It is
usually cheaper to acquire large lots of raw material
and finished goods and hold them than to acquire raw
materials as they are used, or to produce goods as
they are sold. Moreover, the length of time involved
in a production process requires an amount of work-
in-progress inventories which is directly related to the
production rate. This transaction motive is based upon
the requirements of daily activity and the inability to
match receipts of intermediate goods and production
with sales.
The precautionary motive leads firms to hold buffer
stocks of inventory. This motive is based upon the risk
of fluctuations in sales. Unexpected increases or de-
creases in sales may be met by either changing pro-
duction rates or varying inventory levels. Since the
costs of varying production rates can be large, firms
often choose to hold a buffer stock.
The speculative motive for inventory holding rests
upon the possibility of capital gains or future “short-
ages” of raw materials. Firms may gain by buying raw
materials ahead of increases in their prices or holding
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their product for future price appreciation. This type
of inventory holding does not appear to be different
from a precautionary motive, but it remains typical
of the literature to distinguish this motive.3
It is impossible to identify the proportions of inven-
tory held for each reason, but the motives are sugges-
five of the economic forces which determine the stock
of inventory for the firm or the economy. The single
most important factor influencing the demand for a
stock of inventory is probably the expected sales rate.
A larger rate of sales tends to require a larger stock of
inventory. For example, the stock of business inven-
tory in constant (1972) prices, shown in Chart I, has
equaled 22 to 25 percent of real GNP since 1948. An
increase in expected sales leads firms to engage in
positive spending for inventories or inventory invest-
ment. If the expected growth of sales slows, firms
tend to slow inventory investment. When sales are
expected to decline, inventory stocks would tend to
become excessive so that negative inventory invest-
ment, or disinvestment, may occur.
3
See, for example, Evans, Macroeconomic Activity, p. 203.
Evans also includes a backlog of demand as a reason for
holding larger inventories.
Inventory investment, shown in Chart II, is a small
component of- production of final goods and services
(GNP). For example, the largest postwar rate of in-
ventory investment occurred in the fourth quarter of
1973 when it equaled $25.4 billion (1972 dollars) at an
annual rate, or about 2 percent of real gross national
product. However, inventory investment is quite
erratic, and changes in the rate of inventory invest-
ment can be quite large relative to changes in produc-
tion rates, especially during recessions.
The sharpest swings in inventory investment and
the largest positive or negative rates of investment
have occurred since 1973. Quarterly rates of inven-
tory investment over this volatile period (IV/1973
— IV/1976) are presented in Table I. After reaching
its largest postwar rate in the first quarter of the
recession, inventory investment declined, During the
last quarter of the recession (1/1975), inventory in-
vestment became negative as firms depleted inven-
tory stocks at an annual rate of $20.5 billion. Through
the first three quarters of the recovery, inventory
stocks continued to decline, although at slower annual
rates. Inventory investment resumed in 1976 at a
fairly steady annual rate of about $10 billion until
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during these recessions has been reflected in declines
in production for inventory stocks, This is a major
sense in which postwar recessions are said to be
To some extent, the sharp decline in the rate of “inventory recessions.”
inventory investment during the recent recession was
to be expected. Inventory investment had declined
sharply in the five previous postwar recessions. In-










The importance of inventory investment during
recessions is reflected in the ratio of changes in inven-
tory investment to changes in real GNP. As shown in
Chart III, this ratio is usually quite small, However,
there are a few quarters, primarily during recessions,
when the change in inventory investment is greater
than the total change in production. If output falls
during such a quarter, production for inventory stock
falls more, and other components — such as con-
sumption, other types of investment, government pur-
chases and net exports — increase. Most of the ex-
tremely high levels of the ratio of changes in inventory
investment to output fluctuations occurred during
recessions.
In TablelIthe declinein real GNP and real inven-
tory investment, from the peak to the trough quarter,
is shown for each of the six postwar recessions. In two
postwar recessions the decline in the production rate
was greatly exceeded by the drop in inventory invest-
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recession, the decline in the rate of inventory acccu-
mulation was about 57 percent of the decline in
production. Even in the 1953-54 recession, about 36
percent of the decline in output reflected a decline in
the rate of inventory investment.4
However, the notion of an inventory recession in-
volves more than the relative size of fluctuations in
inventory investment and real CNP. The more general
concept of an inventory cycle, of which an inventory
recession is only one stage, implies a specific sequence
of changes in inventory investment before, during,
and after recessions.5
4
These figures may understate the role of inventory invest-
ment during recessions. For example, in the first two quarters
of the 1953-54 recession, real output declined $9.8 billion
while inventory investment declined $10.1 billion.
5
The first maior theoretical attempt to explain inventory in-
vestment and the inventory cycle in terms of a relationship
between desired inventory investment and changes in the
level of sales is L. A. Metrler, “The Nature and Stability of
Inventory Cycles,” Review of Economic Statistics (August
1941), pp. 113-29. A simple explanation and numerical
illustration of the inventory cycle may be found in many
textbooks, including Demhurg and McDougall, Macroeco-
nomics, pp. 367-69. A good discussion of the inventory
investment models spawned by Metzler’s work may he found
in Evans, Macroeconomic Activity, pp. 201-20.
An inventory cycle is a pattern of systematic fluc-
tuations in economic activity associated with inventory
adjustments. These adjustments are alleged to arise
because the desired level of inventory stocks is re-
lated to the expected sales rate. Consequently,
changes in expected sales affect inventory investment.
Moreover, changes in demand for inventory invest-
ment also influence actual and expected sales. In this
theory, such changes in investment spending are
believed to affect output and employmcnt.
Tebte it
Peak to trough Changes tot Real inventory
investment and Real 01* as Postwar Re essions
Oect ne in Real ~etlrne on
lay nary Decl’n ri Cv linen a
On estoneni Real CUP a P ~ at of
Il ces ~o {8lsan ) ~5rtmu ~ Delone on 914P
(1 121 [tfl/(2 X 100
194849 $ 130 $ 47 216600/
19354 6.0 168 357
l9575~ 99 t 4 569
1960-6 87 33 3783
19á970 35 61 574
397375 49 215 563
Ratio
Ch,,t III
Ratio of Change in Inventory Investment to Change in Output
Rauio
9948 9949 1950 1951 1952
Lste,t dots pie 9,5 4,6 q,,,te,




Page 5FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
The following is a scenario of how an inventory
cycle might occur. Some unexpected exogenous force
increases aggregate spending and stimulates a corre-
sponding change in production and employment.
Firms, reacting to their new sales, attempt to change
their inventory levels in the same direction throngh
inventory investment, Thus, further changes in total
spending, income and employment tend to occur. As
inventory approaches its desired level, firms reduce
their rate of spending on inventories causing aggregate
demand and output grosvth to slow. The slowing of
output growth is reinforced since it leads to a further
slowing of inventory investment. The reduction in in-
ventory investment brings sales and income growth to
a halt at the cyclical peak. As inventory investment
declines further, the economy enters a recession and
firms may actnally attempt to meet sales by selling off
inventory stocks. Inventory stocks fall relative to sales
so firms reach a point where inventory replacement is
necessary, even to maintain the low recessionary sales
rate. Inventory restocking increases demand for goods
and services and provides the stimulus for a recovery
and the ensuing expansion.
Two basic observations about recessions emerge
from an inventory cycle theory. The first is that inven-
tory investment declines before and during the early
stages of such a recession, and often becomesnegative
before beginning to recover. Second, inventory invest-
ment tends to recover before the end of a recession.
The pattern of inventory investment in the first five
postwar recession and recovery periods shown in
Chart II conforms to these relationships.6 In the first
four postwar recessions, inventory investment declined
before and during the recession, reached a negative
rate, and recovered before the end of the recession.
In the fifth recession, 1969-70, inventory investment
recovered before it reached a negative rate. In this
case, the rate of growth of inventory stocks slowed,
but firms did not actually reduce inventory stocks as
they had in the prior recessions.7
6This pattern does not demonstrate that these recessions were
“inventory recessions.” It does lend support to the iniportance
of the link between changes in expected sales and inventory
investment. This link and a monetary theory of recessions
yield the same pattem of inventory investment in recessions
and recoveries as that indicated by the inventory cycle theory.
T
Barry Bosworth, “Analyzing Inventory Investment,” Brookingx
Papers on Economic Activity (2:1970), pp. 207-27, argues
that “an inventory cycle is not an adequate frame of refer-
ence” for economic developments in the 1969-71 period.
Most of the argument rests upon the failure of inventory
investment to hecome negative during the recession although
this is not unusual in light of the extent of the decline in real
output. A pattern of inventory behavior in the 1969-70 period
similar to that in prior recessions may not have been evident
from the preliminary data available in 1970.
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In the 1973-75 recession, inventory investment
did not follow the pattern of a typical inventory cycle.
Inventory investment did decline during the recent
recession, but it did not decline prior to the onset of
the recession. Instead, inventory investment rose
sharply to its highest postwsr rate during the first
quarter of the recession. Moreover, inventory invest-
ment did not begin its recovery until the third quarter
of 1975, two quarters after the recession trough and
did not become positive until one year after the reces-
sion trough.
Since the notion of an inventory recession follows
from a relationship between inventory investment and
sales, it is usefnl to examine the relevance of this
relationship in the post\var period. This provides a
standard against which we may compare the be-
havior of recent inventory investment. A simple illus-
tration of the relationship between real inventory
investment and changes in real output or spending
(both at annual rates) is given in Table III for the
period from 1948 through the third quarter of 1973.8
While other important factors which influence inven-
tory investment are omitted, the relationship captures
the importance of sales growth inherent in the inven-
tory cycle theory.°
~Changesin real GNP may not be the appropriate measure of
sales, even for such a simple illustration. Several investiga-
tors have uscd different measures of aggregate sales. See, for
example, the survey by Victor Zamowitz, Orders, Production,
and Ineestnoent — a Cyclical and Structural Analysis (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973), p. 352
and pp. 362-63; or Evans, Macroeconomic Activity, p. 217.
t
Current changes in real output “explain” only 25 percent of
inventory investment. Also, the statistics suggest that other
important factors may have been ignored. Adjustment for this
potential problem, however, does not alter the conclusions
drawn from Chart IV.
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The postwar inventory-output relationship in Table
III implies the predicted inventory investment rates
in Chart IV, based on output changes since 1973. The
predicted pattern is very similar to the experience of
previous recessions. However, the rates implied by
this relationship are markedly different from the
actual inventory investment behavior shown there.
During the recession, actual inventory investment
exceeded, by extremely large amounts, the rates im-
plied by the postwar relationship. Beginning in the
last quarter of the recession (1/1975) and continuing
throughout the remainder of 1975, actual inventory
investment was much smaller than the rates implied
by the postwar relationship.
Other factors which affect inventory investment
apparently dampened the severity of the recession by
keeping inventory investment high.1°“Shortages,” the
termination of price controls in 1973, high rates of
inflation, and the fear of new price controls in 1974
probably pushed inventory investment above the
levels normally desired on the basis of output growth
alone. More importantly, firms apparently did not
anticipate the recession, its length, or its severity, and
were slow to lower production rates and inventory
investment. By the end of the recession, its severity
was more obvious and the excess inventory stock be-
came apparent as well. Thus, the forces wluch dom-
inated inventory investment during the recession also
dominated and dampened the recovery so that
throughout 1975, actual inventory investment was
much lower than the simple investment-output rela-
tionship indicates.
The unusually high rates of inventory investment
which apparently existed during most of the recession
began in the second quarter of 1973. Accumulating
the “excess” of actual investment over the amount
predicted on the basis of output growth from the
second quarter of 1973 yields $19 billion of “excess”
inventory stock by the end of 1974,51 The large rates
at which inventory stocks were depleted in the last
quarter of the recession and throughout the remainder
lOOkun, “A Postmortem,” pp. 220-21, argues that forecasters
would have predicted GNP better for the second half of
1974 if they had accounted for the inventory-output rela-
tionsbip and the inventory cycle. Using seriously erroneous
predictions like those indicated in Chart IV for the second
half of 1974, they would have lowered their GNP forecasts
toward the actual results,
11
Since the investment figures plotted in Chart IV are at
annual rates, the actual addition to stocks in each quarter
is one-fourth the indicated amount. Thus, excess inventory
accumulation is one-fourth the amount by which each quar-
ter’s actual investment exceeds the quarter’s estimated
investment.
Ch,a 9V
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of 1975 eliminated these “excess” inventories. Adding
the amount by which actual investment fell short of
that implied by the postwar inventory-output relation-
ship yields a runoff of inventors’ stocks of about
819 billion,12 Thus, after the first year of recovery
(1/1975 to 1/1976) the errors have cancelled out, and
the simple postwar relationship appears to hold as
well as it did in the earlier period.
The behavior of inventory investment in the recent
recession and recovery supports the view that firms
accumulated excessive inventories (relative to output)
in 1973 and that they continued to invest in excessive
inventories until the end of the recession. Beginning
in the last quarter of the recession and continuing
through the first year of recovery, firms sold off the
excess inventories, with aggregate inventory invest-
ment being negative throughout 1975.13 The rates
of inventory investment in 1976 were to be expected
t2
The estimates of the excess and non-off of inventories are
intended to illustrate the process which was present in
1973-75 and not the precise extent of the problem. The
actual depletion of inventory stock from the fourth quarter
of 1973 to the fourth quarter of 1974 was $12 billion
(see Chart I).
‘3This unusual behavior of inventors’ investment in 1975 is a
major factor in explaining the unusual changes in hank asset
portfolios during the first year of the recovery. See B. Alton
Gilbert, “Bank Financing of the Recovery,” this Review
(July 1976), pp. 2-9.
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as they were consistent with the moderate growth
of sales experienced during the year.
An explanation of a “pause” in a recovery in terms
of the inventory cycle is that inventory is rebuilt by
rapid production until firms reach a desired level of
inventory stocks.14 As the inventory stock approaches
its desired level, production in excess of sales in order
to rebuild inventory stocks is no longer necessary so
that bothproduction growth and inventory investment
slow.
Real GNP growth slowed in 1976, from a 7.3 per-
cent rate in the first year of recovery to a 4.2 percent
annual rate during the second and third quarters
of 1976. This was the pause which caused increasing
concern in the second half of last year. However, in-
ventory investment did not slow during the pause.
Instead, it was higher than the negative rates which
prevailed throughout 1975. Inventory investment was
steadily maintained at its higher rate, hovering around
$10 to $11 billion (constant dollars) through the first
three quarters of 1976. Thus, the data are not con-
sistent with the inventory cycle explanation of a
pause.15
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a connection
between inventory decisions and the slowdown in
growth of total output. In two quarters during the
first year of the recovery (111/1975 and 1/1976), there
were large increases in the rate of inventory invest-
ment. In each quarter, the increase in inventory
investment was matched by a sharp rise in production.
In the first case (111/1975), inventory investment rose
$20.2 billion, but remained negative. In the second
instance (1/1976), inventory investment rose $15.9
billion to a $10.4 billion rate,
The distorting effects of changes in inventory in-
vestment on the pattern of the recovery may be seen
in Chart V. Growth of real final sales (the difference
between output and inventory investment) has been
relatively constant since the trough in the first quarter






erratic. In the two quarters when inventory invest-
ment increased rapidly (111/1975 and 1/1976), real
GNP growth surged upward. These increases in in-
ventory investment reflected the ending of the inven-
tory stock depletion. The same rate of final sales re-
quired an increased rate of production, since firms
were no longer willing to meet sales by depleting
stocks.
The apparent slowdown in the rate of output
growth after a year of recovery was the result of
unusually high output growth in two quarters before
the pause. These two surges in output growth were
not due to changes in sustained forces affecting out-
put growth. Instead, they were associated with once-
and-for-all production changes required by the ending
of the inventory adjustment. The rate of output
growth during the period of the pause reflected the
very steady moderate rate of growth of sales which
has existed since the beginning of the recovery.
The behavior of inventories in the recent recession
and recovery reflects the fact that businesses, like
many economists, under-anticipated the severity and
length of the decline in output. While the inventory
investment rate declined throughout the recession, it
remained positive and large, by historical standards, up
to the last quarter of the recession. After the recession
APRIL 1977
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“The nature of the 1976 economic slowdown is discussed
more fully by Neil A. Stevens and James E. Turley.
“Economic Pause — Some Perspective and Interpretation,”
this Review (December 1976), pp. 2-7.
15
1t may be noted in Chart IV that the predicted inventory
investment rate based upon the earlier postwar relationship
in Table III follows the pattern described by the inventory
cycle explanation of the pause. Following the relatively high
rates of predicted inventury investment in 1975 and the first
quarter of’ 1976, predicted investment declines from the first
through the third quarter of 1978.
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came to an end in early 1975, businesses continued to
adjust to the “excessive” levels of inventory which they
had accumulated. A net inventory mn-off existed in
all four quarters of 1975. To the extent that inventory
adjustments cause production changes, it must be said
that inventory investment played a role of moderating
the decline in production and employment during the
recession and moderating the first three quarters of
the recovery.
As the inventory adjustment came to an end,
increases in production rates were necessary to
moderately expanding sales. The aftermath of
one-time adjustments in production rates in late 1975
and early 1976 was the apparent “pause” of 1976.
During the first quarter of 1976, positive inventory
investment was restored and continued at a steady
rate consistent with the moderate real output growth
experienced throughout most of 1976. Production
growth and inventory investment slowed markedly in
the fourth quarter of 1976 and, apparently, in the first
quarter of this year. If the faster growth in final sales
experienced in the fourth quarter of 1976 persists, as
many observers expect, inventory investment is likely
to be higher in the remainder of 1977 than it was in
1976.
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